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Dodge Billingsley
Following are interviews with Tengiz Sigua, former Georgian Prime Minister, and Jaba Ioseliani, the colorful leader of 
the controversial Mkhedrioni armed formation. Both were intimately involved in Georgia’s state-building process in the 
early 1990s. They were two-thirds of the Military Council (the remaining member, Tengiz Kitovani, now resides in 
Moscow), an interim government that replaced first president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s, government. They 
were also jointly responsible for Eduard Shevardnadze’s rise to power in Georgia as well as the initiation of the conflict 
in the separatist region of Abkhazia.
Both interviews were conducted during summer 2001. At times their answers and comments are at odds with each 
other and challenge the “facts” behind the issues. However, both provide insight as to the workings of the Military 
Council, armed formations, war with Abkhazia and relations with Russia.
INTERVIEW WITH TENGIZ SIGUA
Q: Please tell us about the Military Council, who was 
involved in it and how did it operate
The Military Council was formed 2 January 1992, after 
the transfer of power from President Gamsakhurdia. It 
consisted of three persons: Tengiz Kitovani, Jaba Ioseliani 
and me. It existed until 7 March 1992, when Eduard 
Shevardnadze returned to Georgia. On 10 March 1992, 
the Military Council announced its self-dissolution and the 
State Council was formed, which functioned as a 
legislative body before the new parliament was elected. 
The head of the Council was Eduard Shevardnadze.
Q: How did Shevardnadze become a member of the 
Council?
Before Shevardnadze returned to Georgia, it was 
planned that the existing parliament be re-established. 
However, this plan did not succeed, due to a lack of 
quorum—118 members were required and only 95 
deputies appeared. As a result, while the Military Council 
still existed, the so-called “Debate Council” was formed 
under which all politicians and members of society 
gathered. All important decisions made by the temporary 
government had to be agreed upon by this Council. Soon 
after Shevardnadze’s arrival, the so-called “Debate 
Council” turned into the State Council. As it was not an 
elective body, it was not completely legitimate, but it still 
acted as one, and also as a legislative body, because the re-
establishment of the elective body—the parliament—did 
not succeed. The constituency of the Council became 
larger after Shevardnadze’s arrival. The number of
members increased from 40 to 60. Shevardnadze was 
elected head of the Council.
Q: How was the decision made to send Georgian 
military forces into Abkhazia?
In the spring of 1992, a very unpleasant series of 
events took place in Abkhazia, namely, the systematic 
robbery of railway and motor transport. The losses 
totalled nearly 12 billion Russian rubles in August 1992. 
Negotiations with Abkhaz authorities about stopping the 
robberies were attempted, but finally, on 10 August 1992, 
the State Council decided to deploy troops close to the 
Russian border, e.g., up to the Psou River. They were to 
bring the railway and motorways under control, as well as 
all engineering structures in that area.
I, as Prime Minister, was against using military forces 
in this operation. As far as I was concerned, this operation 
should have been conducted by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, the police, and the armed forces of the railway. 
Those forces existed, and it was their responsibility to 
settle the situation. I believe that the Ministry of Defense 
should defend the country’s borders of the country against 
the enemy, but it is not responsible for the country’s 
internal affairs. However, the State Council made a 
decision that the Ministry of Defense had to be involved in 
this process. Consequently, the armed forces of the 
Ministry of Defense were deployed to the territory of 
Abkhazia. I was informed by telephone that this was 
agreed to by Abkhaz authorities, namely, Ardzinba, but 
then Georgian armed forces overcame armed resistance in
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Ochamchira. This incident paved the way to the armed 
conflict.
Q: Who played the biggest role in making the 
decision to enter Abkhaz territory?
The State Council, and, above all, the head of the State 
Council, Eduard Shevardnadze!
It was unanimous. Nobody was against stabilizing the 
situation, but everyone had a different approach to the 
problem. I was categorically against the involvement of 
the armed forces of the Ministry of Defense, i.e., the 
Georgian Army, in this operation. All this is recorded in 
the protocols. As a result of these robberies Georgia’s 
incurred losses of 9 billion Russian rubles, the total 
amounted to 12 billion rubles. (The attorney general of 
Armenia claimed a loss of 3 billion on goods stolen while 
being transported through Georgia.) It was crucial to 
rectify the situation, but... Once again, I say that this was 
not the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense.
Q: Please talk about the Moscow agreement signed 
on 3 September 1992, your role in it and what 
happened afterwards?
Practically speaking, the Abkhazian conflict started on 
14 August [1992]. On 3 September, negotiations were 
conducted in Moscow—the leaders of Russia, Georgia, 
Abkhazia and the North Caucasian republics were present. 
A document was issued halting operations in Abkhazia and 
negotiations were to begin immediately. In addition, joint 
commissions were formed. I was the head of the Georgian 
Commission. It was a trilateral commission: Georgian- 
Russian-Abkhazian. One of the major issues that I put 
forward was the abolition of all Abkhaz armed formations. 
None of the autonomous units of the Russian republics, 
Azerbaijan, or Central Asia, had their own armed forces 
during and after Soviet rule, they had only police or 
militia.
Here Russia demonstrated its dual character and its 
double approach. Russia considered it impossible that 
autonomous [republics] like Bashkiria, Tatarstan, 
Chechnya, Ossetia and others should have their own armed 
formations except for police, but they insisted on having 
one in Abkhazia—why?
This Russian behavior has its background. When the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union became reality Moscow 
was hard at work on how to keep the former Soviet 
republics under its control. The first plan was as follows: 
To form so-called Interfronts in those former Soviet 
republics where the percentage of Russian-speaking 
communities was high. The purpose was to gather the 
non-local population under these Interfronts and direct 
them against the local authorities. This plan was
implemented in the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia), Moldova, Ukraine, as well as in the 
Transcaucasian republics (Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan). Since the Russian-speaking communities in 
Georgia were very loyal to the local communities, this plan 
failed. However, those attempts were apparent in 1989- 
90.
In those republics where the Interfronts appeared to be 
unsuccessful they planned to form separatist movements, 
against the local governments, out of the local national 
minorities. Such attempts were undertaken in Southern 
Ossetia and Southern Georgia—Kvemo Kartli—that had 
compact pockets of Armenian and Azerbaijanian 
populations. This plan proved unsuccessful in Kvemo 
Kartli, but unfortunately, they made this plan work in 
Southern Ossetia and in Abkhazia. These provocations 
were directed at weakening the local government; if not by 
means of the Interfront, then by separatist movements, so 
that these republics would stay under their [Russian] 
influence.
It was an imperialistic trick. Russian nationalism was 
unable to accept the fact that the Romanov empire, which 
had expanded for 300 years, should fall apart in one day. 
Important regions, like the Baltic States, the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, were starting to steadily break away. So the 
conflict in Abkhazia was part of Russia’s extensive plan. 
It was obvious from the very first days of the conflict that 
Abkhazia was supported by Russia.
Q: What happened afterwards?
The Georgian side made several mistakes. First of all, 
the decision of the State Council, which required this 
operation to be finished in two days, should have been 
fulfilled. On 14 August 1992, the operation should have 
started and, on 16 August, our armed forces and police 
were supposed to be at the Georgian-Russian border, that 
is, at the Psou River to take control of the railway, 
motorway, and engineering structures such as aqueducts 
and so on. But, suddenly, on 15 August our troops were 
stopped in Sukhumi by Shevardnadze’s order. At that time 
our formations were already past the Gumista River and 
were ready to carry out their plan.
Shevardnadze’s decision was not agreed upon by any 
member of the Council—neither with me nor with 
Kitovani or Ioseliani. The presidium of the State Council 
consisted of four members and, according to the rales, 
none of them had a right to make an independent decision. 
Moreover, if even one of us disagreed on a certain issue, 
he had a right to impose a veto. But, Shevardnadze gave 
the order to the commander of our armed formations to 
stop in Sukhumi, and this was a very big mistake.
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Shevardnadze also allowed the Russian Defense 
Minister to deploy troops from Azerbaijan to Abkhaz 
territory, in Gudauta, and suddenly they appeared in our 
rear. It was the famous assault landing regiment #345, 
based in Ganja, Azerbaijan. Again, we did not agree with 
Shevardnadze regarding this decision. I asked him why he 
had allowed the Russian Defense Ministry to deploy an 
entire regiment from another country—the Soviet Union 
had already disintegrated and nobody had the right to 
move armed forces into Georgia. This issue was not 
ratified by the State Council nor its Presidium. 
Shevardnadze answered that he was afraid the Abkhaz 
would attack the Russian military base in Gudauta to 
capture weapons. This was not a valid argument. The 
Russian base in Gudauta is highly fortified, not even a bird 
can fly in. Who would dare take arms from there by 
force? The assault landing regiment #345 was the 
strongest armed detachment, and showed the strongest 
resistance to Georgian armed forces. Allowing it into 
Georgia was a big mistake.
After signing the agreement on 3 September 1992, we 
expected that the situation would settle down, but 
following the instructions given the Abkhaz by the 
Russians, the Abkhaz broke all the agreements, and this 
process continues. More than 40 documents were signed 
unilaterally as well as internationally..., but none of the 
documents had any positive impact. I personally think that 
the Georgian side is very tolerant of Russia. It is obvious 
that Russia played a negative role in the Georgian- 
Abkhazian conflict, and now Russia is a “peacekeeper” in 
Abkhazia... This is unacceptable when it is possible to 
have normal peacekeeping forces led by the UN or EU 
which can carry out their mission correctly. During the 
past seven years Russian peacekeepers “brilliantly” 
performed one of their duties—they fixed the border 
between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia on the Inguri 
River. That is absolutely unacceptable for me and for the 
majority of Georgian society.
Another big mistake was made in July 1993 by signing 
the agreement by which peace was supposed to be brought 
about. As a result of this agreement, all military hardware 
was withdrawn from Sukhumi. This document should not 
have been signed, because 10 previous agreements had 
been violated... In early September of 1993 all military 
hardware was withdrawn from Sukhumi to Poti, but the 
Abkhaz side moved their heavy weapons less than 25 km 
from Sukhumi, so that in case of emergency they could 
bring them to Sukhumi in just 30 minutes. That was 
exactly what happened. On 16 September 1993, that 
agreement was also violated and massive attacks were 
launched against Sukhumi. Sukhumi fell on 27 September.
Two days later Abkhazia was no longer under Georgian 
jurisdiction.
Q: What can you tell us about civil and military 
relations during the conflict?
I can show you a document that makes it clear that 
Shevardnadze tried to make the Ministry of Defense 
responsible for everything... As I told you before, it was 
my position that the Ministry of Defense should not have 
taken part in this operation. It was an internal affair. I can 
show you the protocols of the Council where you’ll see 
that Shevardnadze made all the decisions. It is not a 
secret; it was published. The problem is that 
Shevardnadze might say one thing today, but say the 
opposite tomorrow. He sometimes forgets things. He 
forgot that it was already documented. My opposing 
opinion is recorded.
A meeting was held at the State Council on 11 August. 
Shevardnadze’s and my speeches are recorded where I am 
categorically against the Army’s involvement. Moreover, 
this operation was supposed to start on 19 or 20 August, 
but Shevardnadze mentioned in his speech that he had 
asked our armed forces to accelerate this process. So, the 
operation began on 14 August instead of 19 August. It is 
documented.
He usually says that we should not have entered 
Sukhumi. But the road does not go around Sukhumi. It is 
impossible to reach the Psou River unless you go straight 
through Sukhumi. I cannot blame it on poor knowledge of 
geography. It was a provocative action.
The Military Council ordered the police to begin the 
operation.on 14 August, and reach the Psou River on 16 
August, form three camps, and control the railway and 
highway. Meanwhile, Shevardnadze said that they should 
not enter Sukhumi. Was the army supposed to walk over 
the Caucasus mountains?! It is absurd! All these facts 
have been exposed. It is not true when Shevardnadze says 
that the soldiers did not obey him. He made all the 
decisions. It was his decision to begin the operation, to 
stop the armed formations, and to move the Russian 
detachments from Azerbaijan to Georgia. It was his 
decision not to launch a counter attack on 16 March 1993, 
when the Abkhaz detachments were demoralized. It was 
his decision to sign the agreement of 27 June 1993, 
requiring the removal of armed detachments from 
Sukhumi. There was an open fight in Parliament about 
this issue—that the agreement should not have been 
signed. But Shevardnadze took this responsibility. He 
takes on too many duties, but the responsibility for them is 
zero.
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Q: In your opinion, what was the reason for the loss?
My personal opinion is that the operation planned by 
the Military Council had to be carried out by all means but 
in different terms. Second, the State Council was an 
executive body in Georgia and nobody had the right to 
ignore its resolutions. It was a misstep when 
Shevardnadze stopped the armed forces in Sukhumi as 
there was no sign of resistance from the Abkhaz side at 
that time.
The most important matter was that the Russian 
parliament—the Duma—was on vacation during August. 
The Russian generals were unable to make any serious 
political decision, such as to put up a resistance to 
Georgian forces. Our police passed Ochamchira and 
Sukhumi without encountering any problems. Even 
though there was a powerful Russian Ministry of Defense 
base in Ochamchira, they did not nothing, because they 
had not received any orders. It means that no political 
decision had yet been made in Moscow. There was a very 
strong regiment in Sukhumi, near the Shukura quarter, but 
they did not do anything to stop the advance of Georgian 
forces. The first attack was carried out by the Abkhaz 
Guard. This Guard did not have enough power, weapons, 
or even fighters, to put up a strong resistance.
Stopping the Army in Sukhumi on 15 August 1992 was 
a big mistake which caused the conflict to drag on for two 
years and eventually led to a serious loss. If Georgian 
troops had been given the chance to carry out this mission, 
as charged by the State Council, reach the Psou River and 
take control of the territory on 16 August, I am sure that 
Russia would not have been able to turn its provocative act 
into the war. Stopping the troops in Sukhumi gave the 
Russian-Abkhaz side a chance to gain power. They formed 
a headquarters and began receiving military supplies from 
Russia ten to twelve days later. A political decision was 
made in Moscow to support the Abkhaz side, and military 
operations were launched against Georgia.
When our anti-aircraft forces shot down a Russian SU- 
27 ground attack aircraft, the pilot appeared to have a map 
proving that he was given a special mission in Rostov to 
fly to Georgia. This aircraft was sent by the Russian 
Ministry of Defense. It did not come from the Abkhaz.
Captured Russian spies who took part in operations in 
Sukhumi admitted that they were Russian army officers 
collecting military information for the Abkhaz. There is 
no need to question Russia’s actions. There is a simple 
answer: Russia acted according to its political decision—to 
separate Abkhazia from Georgia for some period, which 
would force Georgia to become their slave, as it had been 
for many decades.
Q: It was said that war supplies were stopped in 
Samegrelo. What can you tell us about that?
Two or three times military supplies were sent from 
Tbilisi, but the army received canned food in the boxes 
instead. This was subversive activity against the Georgian 
Army. Moreover, whenever the Georgian Police and 
Army entered settlements to bring it within Georgian 
jurisdiction, they received orders from Tbilisi to leave the 
area. For example, Tkvarcheli. What military strategist 
would leave the enemy in his rear? Tkvarcheli is east of 
Sukhumi and they were in Sukhumi while Tkvarcheli was 
in enemy hands. General Gudja Kurashvili wrote that he 
had a chance to enter Tkvarcheli peacefully three times 
without firing a shot, but an order came from Tbilisi not to 
enter Tkvarcheli. Tkvarcheli played an important role in 
the last powerful attack that caused the loss of Abkhazia. 
There were two fronts, one in Sukhumi and another, 
behind us, the Tkvarcheli-Ochamchira front.
Q: What is the future for Abkhazia?
We have to keep Abkhazia’s statute of autonomy with 
the same rights that it possessed before the conflict. The 
Soviet Union consisted of 15 republics, four of 
them—Russia, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan—had 
autonomous units. All the other republics were unitary 
states. No autonomous units existed on their territories. 
The autonomous units in the four republics were 
artificially created by the Communist Party. Since they 
already exist, the authorities have no right to abolish them 
unless the people decide to do so. That is why Abkhazia 
has to remain autonomous. Even during Soviet times they 
had their own independent university and TV broadcasting 
in the Abkhaz language. Neither Tatarstan nor Bashkiria 
had such advantages.
During the Soviet period, and even afterwards, Georgia 
was very tolerant toward the Abkhaz. The idea that the 
Abkhaz were being oppressed is not true. If you consider 
the situation in the other Soviet autonomies you’ll see that 
it is an absolutely false argument that the Abkhaz were 
kept down. On the other hand, it is ancient Georgian land. 
If you are a national minority here and do not accept the 
priorities of the country, do not respect its flag,- hymn and 
language, you cannot be a citizen of this country. Such 
people should go to their own country. But the Abkhaz do 
not have an independent homeland and that is why we 
cannot tell them to go home. They also are inhabitants of 
this old land, which is now called Abkhazia. In this case 
they should respect the priorities of the country as set forth 
by the international community, i.e., flag, language and 
national anthem. Then nobody will be against protecting 
their interests.
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As a matter of fact, according to the opinion of the 
international community, the problem of national 
minorities is considered the second most important issue. 
However, this should not exclude the most important 
issue—respect for and inviolability of existent state 
borders. Everyone with separatist intentions, and all 
separatist groups, should accept the idea that they are 
incapable of reaching their goals in today’s world.
INTERVIEW WITH JABA IOSELIANI
Interview conducted on May 25, 2001, at his home in Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia
Q: Tell us about the Mkhedrioni
In 1988, when it was obvious that the USSR was 
disintegrating, there were ethnic clashes in the Bolnisi 
and Marneuli regions. At that time Georgian forces were 
not armed. Nobody had any idea how or who could 
protect the country. At the same time, some political 
parties were created and rallies were being held. The 
police was disarmed as Moscow completely removed its 
armament, and of course we had the Russian Army here. 
I have had experience in life. I even had some weapons 
at home. So young people gathered around me. We 
heard that there were hostilities against Georgians in 
Marneuli [an Azeri enclave] so about 50 of us went there. 
We did not attack or use force. We just regulated the 
situation. The government tried to remain neutral during 
the hostilities and not to intervene in the conflicts. 
Everybody was psychologically prepared for the collapse 
of the country, but still nobody dared to act against, not 
even the police. Soon events occurred in [South] Ossetia. 
A group of 40,000 people went to organize a rally in 
Tskhinvali [capital of South Ossetia] and we joined them 
there. We were not called Mkhedrioni at this time; 
everybody called us “Jaba’s boys.”
Q: Was the name Mkhedrioni being used at that 
time?
As I said it was called “Jaba’s Boys,” because they 
followed me and they all were young. After the rally [in 
Tskhinvali] we heard that Ossetians began to attack 
Georgians in Tskhinvali. We entered the city immediately 
and took 100 Ossetians captive. It was a small battle, 
only one of our fighters and two civilians were wounded. 
We had been billeted in different villages and they 
entered the villages by bus, shooting around. We shot 
their wheels and took 100 prisoners. They were shocked 
that there were only six of us. We talked and discussed 
the situation for two days and departed on good terms. 
The government tried to intervene but we did not let 
them. We settled the situation and left. But 
Gamsakhurdia’s people started to create an atmosphere of 
conflict in South Ossetia, by taking Ossetians captive 
soon after. So, we had to return and stabilize the 
situation. The Ossetians begun to trust us. They could 
see that we were armed but at the same time we were 
something like a peace mission, which tried to reconcile 
them. But Gamsakhurdia’s political branch became more 
provocative. They started to persecute Ossetians in 
Tbilisi, Borjomi, Bakuriani, but not in Tskhinvali.
[By the time the war started in Abkhazia in 1992] the 
number of our soldiers was already 2000-3000, and 
serious people joined us, for example, Merab Alexidze, 
an academician and Director of the Institute of 
Geophysics. So it was becoming awkward to be referred 
to as “Jaba’s Boys.” We decided to form a traditional 
military structure and call it Mkhedrioni.
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Jaba Ioseliani, seated second from left. Abkhazia, 1992. Copyright © Georgian State Information Service.
Q: Was Mkhedrioni basically formed out of 
acquaintances and friends?
It consisted of acquaintances as well as strangers. I 
was popular among young people, so they came to me. 
They saw something romantic or patriotic in it. The 
experiences we had together in Mameuli and Bolnisi kind 
of united us.
Mkhedrioni had units in several regions and towns of 
Georgia, for example, Bolnisi, Kutaisi, Samtredia and so 
on. Each of them had their own commander... More 
important, our forces were formed on a voluntary basis. 
We did not ask anybody to join us and fight. We just 
announced that we were going. Anybody could join us if 
they chose.
We had our Council of War consisting of 12 to 18 
members. It included a Political Council, consisting of 2 
or 3 persons; I was chairman of this Council of War. 
Members of the Council and unit commanders rotated 
among Mkhedrioni members, depending on who was best 
qualified to carry out the operation. The unit 
commanders were often replaced. For example, 
sometimes the villagers were brave and good fighters, but
they were not good city fighters. On the other hand, a 
fighter from the city was able to be more flexible and 
practical, so he would become a commander. We don’t 
have any trained soldiers. We were defined by the talent 
and skills of our fighters.
Q: Did your Mkhedrioni include any military 
specialists?
Yes of course, we had several, but they did not get 
along with us. They were often easily confused... They 
usually were given special assignments, such as dealing 
with armaments.
In Ochamchira [during the war in Abkhazia 1992- 
1993] the [National] Guard, Army and Mkhedrioni fought 
together. The new commander of the Army, Lieutenant 
General Kamkamidze, had graduated from military 
academy and fought in Afghanistan, he had combat 
experience. We were planning an operation and he had 
to meet with the Mkhedrioni. He was surprised at the 
way our fighters were dressed, some in coats, some in 
Nabadi [traditional, non-woven coat, made of wool, 
mostly worn by people in the mountains] and how relaxed
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they were. But after some time he admitted that they 
were real fighters. I’ll tell you one story.
The Ministry of Defense sent us troops. We happened 
to meet them on the way while we were examining the 
positions. They wore uniforms and helmets and looked 
like a real army. One of our fighters said that he envied 
them as a result.
We had launched an attack in one village, Merkula, 
and occupied half of it. We were planning to occupy the 
other half but it got dark. We decided to stop and let the 
Army stand guard at night, as we were very tired from 
fighting. We wanted to rest and continue our operation in 
the morning. I returned to the headquarters and while I 
took off my bulletproof vest, I heard some noise. The 
army had abandoned their positions and run away. The 
boy who had envied them (he was wearing a lady’s coat) 
chased after them. What I want to say is this; special 
training, discipline and a uniform does not a soldier make, 
if one is not a fighter in his heart.
Q: What can you tell us about the discipline in 
Mkhedrioni?
The Abkhaz can prove that we never abandoned our 
positions. Although they call us bandits they cannot say 
that Mkhedrioni abandoned its positions. We lost the war 
but have never left one another. Friendship, brotherhood, 
respect and love for one another has kept us united.
Q: Was Mkhedrioni renewed with the name of 
rescue corps?
In 1991, when civil war broke out [with President 
Gamsakhurdia], we were basically the leading forces 
there, because half of the [National] Guard was on 
Gamsakhurdia’s side. Due to events in Samegrelo and 
war in Abkhazia, we did not have time to officially 
register, but it became necessary in the end.
The way Shevardnadze acted at that time makes me 
think that either he was not sensible enough or he was a 
provocateur. During the war in Abkhazia, when we were 
the leading military force of Georgia, he intended to 
attack our unit of 200 fighters in Rustavi. Of course we 
would have defended ourselves, and who knows how it 
would have ended. Both Shevardnadze and 
Gamsakhurdia showed such intentions several times.
We’ve experienced two kinds of dictatorial power. 
The first was Gamsakhurdia, who considered us his worst 
enemies, because we were against his authoritarian rule 
and dictatorship. That’s why he tried to get rid of us. 
The second was Shevardnadze. In the beginning he 
supported us, but once he started to establish his authority 
and dictatorship he did the same. I call this dictatorship. 
He started to establish his authority by removing
everyone, from a cleaner to Prime Minister, and intervene 
in the economy and many other fields. Dictatorship does, 
not necessarily mean that he has to arrest everyone or 
drink blood. His actions already made him a dictator.
It might sound exaggerated, but we were the army of 
freedom, which was unacceptable for governmental 
structures, because they consisted of the same people that 
were in the Soviet government—the same Communist 
way of working, based on corruption and “robbery”. We 
were against it, but of course, we were not allowed to be 
formally registered. They used to complain that 
Mkhedrioni members were walking around with 
weapons. What else were we supposed to do during the 
civil war and intervention?
On the other hand, we were not angels. It is 
impossible that all 8000 fighters were perfect. Today I 
heard about an accident that three men took alcohol by 
force from a booth, claiming that they were Mkhedrioni 
members... Two or three members of Mkhedrioni might 
have done this kind of thing, but the Russians robbed 
Europe and they were called liberators. We could hold 
them and settle this problem by ourselves, but 
Shevardnadze and his Communist team took advantage of 
it, and wrote about us in every newspaper and magazine. 
During my trial I said that we could not stay calm in the 
face of conflict and civil war.
Q: Have you ever expelled a member from 
Mkhedrioni?
Not only expelled, we disbanded the Mkhedrioni unit 
of Khashuri because they were committing robberies. 
After making sure of it, we shot them in the legs and they 
are now handicapped. We did not have them arrested; we 
did not want to publicize their actions. We also used to 
expel drug addicts, except those who were our old 
friends, but we constantly agitated against drug-taking. 
We never accepted drug addicts. Everybody blamed us 
for it, but it is not true.
Q: Can you tell us about entering Abkhazia?
I was against entering Abkhazia. I knew it would 
prove fatal because Russia had a hand in it. I had brought 
up the question about our relations with Russia several 
times in Parliament. Some issues had to be agreed to with 
Russia before entering Abkhazia. But Shevardnadze 
thought he could manage this problem by deceiving 
Russia. He can be cunning sometimes but he cannot 
deceive the whole country. I, personally, and the 
Mkhedrioni were against starting the war. Do you think 
that they were striving to fight and die? They just wanted 
to finish what they fought for before. We lost 800 fighters 
during that period.
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Q: As I understand it, the decision to enter 
Abkhazia should have been made after reaching a 
consensus, and you were the member of the State 
Council and had the right to vote.
I was a member of the presidium and had a right to 
vote, but at that time Shevardnadze was the president. Do 
not believe that we went there to fight. Our plan was to 
control the railway and at the same time, demonstrate our 
strength, or flex our muscles, to the Abkhaz. The 
situation worsened when Abkhazia declared itself a 
republic, and they elected a parliament that consisted of 
28 Abkhaz and 26 Georgian parliamentarians, while the 
Georgian population was three times larger than that of 
the Abkhaz. Gamsakhurdia supported this. Most 
important, the Zviadists [followers of ex-president Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia] blocked the Zugdidi railway and robbed 
the trains.
Mkhedrioni was not responsible for control of the 
railway, this had to be done by the army and police, but 
Kitovani did not fulfill his mission. The Russians 
delivered him heavy weapons and he sent the army but he 
personally went to Kutaisi. At that time Ardzinba 
[current president of Abkhazia] formed a guard of 200 
people, similar to Mkhedrioni. Shevardnadze and 
Ardzinba agreed to control the railway together with 
Kitovani’s army. Kitovani was supposed to meet 
Ardzinba to agree on the details, but Kitovani went to 
Kutaisi.
Q: The army did not have a leader on this expedition?
That is correct. When they went to Okhurei [a village 
close to Ochamchira], the Abkhaz opened fire and 500 
policemen retreated from their positions. In spite of this, 
the National Guard reached Sukhumi but was stopped 
near the Red Bridge and was unable to enter the city. 
Shevardnadze called me and asked the whereabouts of 
Kitovani. He was very concerned and even supposed that 
Kitovani may have committed suicide. This made me 
laugh, but we could not find him for two days. Finally, 
we found him in the Tskhaltubo Military Sanatorium. 
Meanwhile, the situation in Abkhazia worsened. I was 
respected there and decided to talk to Labakhua and 
Ankvabi [Abkhaz officials]. We agreed to stabilize the 
situation together. I could stabilize the situation in 
Sukhumi.
I, together with [Tengiz] Sigua, went to Sukhumi 
where we met Kitovani. We planned to negotiate with 
Ardzinba, but it was impossible to meet him, so we 
negotiated with Ankvabi and others. However they were 
unable to make any decision without Ardzinba.
Q: Did the National Guard manage to deploy troops 
in Sukhumi by this time?
No, they were still near the Red Bridge, where the 
situation began to deteriorate and serious clashes took 
place. I asked Kitovani not to retaliate but he was sure he 
could easily defeat them. Meanwhile, Labakhua [Abkhaz 
official] kept calling, complaining that in spite of our 
agreement Kitovani was still attacking. I assured him that 
I would stop the attacks. I talked to Kitovani one more 
time but unsuccessfully, he was anxious to attack 
Sukhumi.
Kitovani, as Defense Minister and a Member of 
Parliament, was the main figure there and did not 
consider my suggestion not to enter Sukhumi. I knew it 
would have a fatal end, so (Tengiz) Sigua and I returned, 
Kitovani was supposed to stay. The next morning 
Kitovani surprisingly appeared during our meeting with 
Shevardnadze. He was holding an [Abkhaz] flag. (He 
treated that flag as if it had come from the Reichstag.) He 
had entered Sukhumi and occupied the government 
building, but could not go further. The Abkhaz had 
“disarmed” the Russians at their military base near the 
Gumista River, but in reality the Russians let them take 
2000 guns. They were able to put up a defensive at the 
Gumista River. I was forced into the war two or three 
days later.
Q: Was the problem the result of political 
interference or in the lack of cooperation between 
military units?
Both! Shevardnadze was unable to control the 
situation. He mainly concentrated on keeping his power 
over us. He even tried to get rid of Kitovani and myself. 
For that reason he intended to start a dispute between 
[Kitovani and Karkarashvili] by making Gia 
Karkarashvili a General, although he lost Gagra. We 
were very close to Tkvarcheli, about one and a half 
kilometers, but there were just 200-300 of us and we did 
not dare attack a town of 18,000 people. According to the 
plan, we were to unite with 1000 of Karkarashvili’s men, 
but he did not appear. He was in Sukhumi, and instead of 
coming to Tkvarcheli he went to Tbilisi where 
Shevardnadze appointed him to the position of Defense 
Minister.
Q: A lot of formations existed, but they never 
united?
Ambitions. Once I formed Mkhedrioni, Noda Natadze 
became ambitious to form his own formation called Imedi 
(hope). Why should Natadze do this when he is afraid to 
walk the streets, fearing he might be attacked be street 
boys?
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We, Mkhedrioni, gathered in Martkhopi and 
demanded that all formations unite. I was ready to 
rename the Mkhedrioni and call it the Georgian Army. 
The boys were against this, but I insisted that the 
existence of two parallel formations always results in war. 
The commander of Imedi, David Khomasuridze, was 
against uniting with us. Apparently, Nodar Natadze 
insisted that Imedi remain independent, but we forced 
them to join us. Soon after, Natadze visited me and we 
again argued this matter. He feared that if Russia 
attacked us they would be able to destroy our entire force 
in one blow. I told him not to talk nonsense and made 
him leave my house. Everyone knows about the meeting 
in Martkhopi, when we demanded that all the formations 
unite. That was the reason for our hunger strike. I was 
against Gamsakhurdia’s plan to form a [National] Guard 
in November as the war [in South Ossetia] was already 
started and we were there, ready to fight.
Q: It is understandable why this did not happen 
during Gamsakhurdia’s presidency, but what was 
the reason that all the formations did not unite 
under the aegis of the Ministry of Defense in 1992- 
1994?
The reason was Shevardnadze’s incorrect approach to 
the problems. I am not exaggerating. I, Jaba Ioseliani, let 
him have my chair [in the Military Council] and even 
became his deputy. It was my initiative to bring 
Shevardnadze to Georgia. Sigua and Kitovani were 
against it. However, they did not loose anything. They 
both remained in their positions of Prime Minister and 
Defense Minister respectively. Why should he not trust 
me? Even before arriving from Moscow, in an interview 
in Der Spiegel magazine, he stated that he planned to 
remove Kitovani and me. Shevardnadze’s main objective 
has always been to create a web of intrigue. He is a 
careerist. He had the same goals when he was Secretary 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He 
always puts his career first.
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